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"U. S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD
THE SOVIET UNION: PROJECTIONS
FOR THE YEAR 2000."
Mary Astrid Tuminez*
In a recent interview with Time magazine,
Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev said:
You asked me what is the primary thing
that defines Soviet-American relations.
I think it is the immutable fact that
whether we like each other or not'l only
together can we survive or perish.
Indeed, Soviet-American relations are such that
the world's survival is dependent upon a harmonious interaction between these two countries. For
this and other reasons, the Soviet Union is and
will Ion g remain a prime concern for U. S. foreign
policy. In projecting future directions for U. S.
policy, it is important to keep in mind domestic
trends and developments in the Soviet Union that
may affect the formulation of that policy. These
domestic concerns include economics, politics, and
ideology and culture.
Soviet Economy
Western scholars agree that the Soviet
economy
faces
some
formidable
problems.
Foremost is the slowdown in economic growth.
Annual 'Soviet GNP growth has dropped from 5.5
*Astrid is a senior from the Philippines
majoring in Russian and International Relations.
Last summer she participated in an intensive
Russian language study program in Moscow.
Upon graduation she will begin a master's degree
in Russian Area Studies.
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percent in 1955 to 3.7 percent in 1975. and.
finally. to 2.7 percent in 1980.
It has no~
increased significantly' in the last five years.
The labor force also continues to diminish due to
declining birth rates and increasing retirement.
The situation is further exacerbated by military
demands for manpower. extracting a considerable
number of eligible workers from the labor force.
The Soviets are also unsuccessful in effectively
substituting labor with capital; capital is not
increased or modernized at a rate sufficient to
compensate for the decrease in the labor force.
Moreover. many Soviets prefer employment at
white-collar jobs. and steer their children in that
direction. hence lessening available resources for
more labor-intensive occupations.
Accordingly.
agriculture suffers most from the labor shortage.
This is aggravated by increasing rural-urban
migration. leading to a projected 1.5 percent
annual decrease in the agricultural labor force
until the year 1995. 3
The decline in the size of the labor force
results in low productivity and prompts the
government to subsidize agricultural and other
consumer goods.
Annually.
the government
spends 40 billion rubles on milk and meat subsidies and 6.5 billion rubles on housing subsidies.
Nonetheless.
short\ges exist and consumers
remain discontented.
Besides a declining labor force. Soviet
agriculture is fraught with other challenges. The
Soviets continue to heavily import grain from the
West. Between 1984-85 alone. thW imported 43
million tons of grain from the West.
Development
in infrastructure. capital equipment. and material
inputs also lag. Bad roads make it very difficult
to transfer produce from one center to another.
and poor packaging materials and practices
increase product losses. Although 33 percent of
total investment is absorbed by agriculture,
mechanization. nevertheless. remains a problem.
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The Soviets continue to produce machinery
impressive in quantity but poor in quality.
Finally, planning and coordination in industry
often do not coincide. One sector may produce
enough fertilizer but other sectors fail to produce
bags or 6 machines to pack and spread the
fertilizer.
Oil is another major economic concern,
particularly with the recent decline in oil prices.
In 1985, oil production in the Soviet Union was
226 million barrels below target.
This lag
threatens the modernization of the Roviet economy
as well as the trade advantages they have over
Eastern-bloc nations.
With less oil to export,
there will be less hard currency, and the Soviet
Union will be unable to import badly needed grain
and technology.
The Soviets might therefore
tighten domestic energy consumption in order to
save energy for export. Th4s could heighten the
discontent among the people.
Domestic economic problems further include a
very high savings rate (187 billion rubles in
1983--making the total savings increase greate
than the retail sales increase of the same year),
a growing black market, and labor innovations
such as shabashniki. Shabashniki are groups of
workers hiring themselves out as carpenters,
agricultural workers, or construction workers on
collective or state farms. They do regular work
that needs to be finished by specific deadlines
and they do it quickly and efficiently.
Often,
they have to travel great distances to find work,
but they are paid three to four times as much as
the
normal worker.
The success of the
shabashniki
reaffirms
a
growing
consumer
mentality in the Soviet Union and the important
role that initiative and incentive play in the
accomplishment of tasks. This suggests a need for
reform in the economic system--a reform that will
allow b&th consumers and producers to move more
freely.

s
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Economic reform in the Soviet Union will
involve multiple strategies.
To increase their
labor force, theY1<fill have to either decrease the
siz~ .of th~ army
o.r find wa~s t~1 fuse military
trmmng wIth economIC productIon.
Decreasing
the military force can be feasible only when the
Soviets see less threatening and less taut relations with the United States.
Once the labor
force is increased, efforts to improve the quality
of production must follow.
This may be done
through better use of improved equipment which
may be procured from the West. With products of
higher quality, Soviet consumers will most likely
spend more and save less, thuf2 allowing for
greater investment in the economy.
In the agricultural sector, reforms for
higher production have been decree13 (a total of
150 decrees in the last few years),
but with
no concrete results. Unless more tangible results
are seen, the legitimacy of the Soviet government
will be questioned; for people continue to have
rising expectations and want tPf4r government to
deliver the goods it promises.
Much can be
done through cooperation with the West; however,
it is doubtful that the Soviet Union would
undertake radical changes in its political-economic
structure in order to direct the economy more
efficiently.
Soviet scholars agree that saving their
economy is a workable proposition. The Soviet
economy has always had problems and the people
are used to hardships. But although they are
determined to boost their economy, the Soviets
are generally unwilling to take risks 1Shat may
undermine their military superiority.
Their
leaders constantly emphasize the state's victories
in two world wars, the industrialization of the
country, the achievement of military parity with
the United States, and l~e attainment of a higher
standard
of
living.
Much
has
been
accomplished in the past, and despite the
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slowdown in economic growth, t'l1e economy is,
nevertheless,
growing,
and
not stagnating.
Besides, the Soviet Urtlpn is the world's second
major economic power.
"Why, [then], should
its leaders conclu~§ that the problems they face
today are fatal?"
Because of this relatively
hopeful Soviet outlook on their economy, the
United States cannot count on the Soviet Union's
full dependence on the West in achieving economic
recovery. Rather, current developments suggest
that avenues in the economic sphere are open for
greater
U • S. -Soviet
cooperation.
American
exports of foodstuffs and consumer goods in
particular will alleviate the long lines that cause
absent'1wsm and low productivity in the Soviet
Union.
The United States will benefit by
increasing its international trade, and the Soviet
Union will be able to use money bonuses as a
work incentive because the workers would have
something to buy. Further, the Soviets will view
the United States less as an adversary than as a
trade partner--and this, perhaps, will lead to
more meaningful efforts at developing friendly
U. S. -Soviet relations.
Soviet Politics
Soviet politics is another area of concern for
U. S. foreign policy. The CPS U (Commu nist Party
of the Soviet Union) and its political body, the
Politburo-, preside over the Soviet political
system.
The core of the Politburo and of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party is made
up of older men who came into power in the
1930s, have a low level of educ~ion, and
generally come from peasant families.
Despite
this
background,
Soviet
political
leaders
nevertheless form an elite group, unwilling to
yield substantial political power to the workers.
Although they comprise 61 percent of the
population and 43 percent of the party, workers
make up only 6 percent of the Party Central
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Committee. 21 Due to these facts, some scholars
concede that there is no pluralism in Soviet
government.
However,
substantial
evidence
suggests otherwise.
From the Khrushchev and
Brezhnev eras, some decentralization and a
movement toward a stabilized oligarchy has taken
place in the Soviet Union.
Although strong
leadership exists, Stalin's one-man rule is no
longer prevalent because there is competition
within the Party apparatus.
In fact, once a
leader is chosen. his first major challenge is to
consolidate his power by gaining the confidence of
the other members of the political elite.
His
innovativeness and effectiveness will be directly
proportional to his ability to dissolve competing
elements in the political hierarchy 2~nd to
consolidate the decision-making authority.
It can be further asserted that decisionmaking in the USSR has developed a more institutionalized and consensual nature. Government
is no longer by dictatorship but by "commission
and rule through alliance and facti~ys," particularly during the Brezhnev regime.
Thus, for
U. S. -Soviet foreign policy,

. . . it would be a grievous error to
accept claims and pretense as reality,
and to neglect the evidence of a
multitude of tensions, functional and
jurisdictional disputes, role conflicts,
special
groups,
lobbies,
vested
interests, intellectual and perceptual
differences,
regional
and
ethnic
rivalries, power struggles, technical
disputes and various ot~~r antagonisms
[in Soviet government 1 •
The
current
Soviet
leadership
is
of
particular
interest.
Mikhail
Gorbachev,
a
relatively young leader, is at the helm. He will
be only 69 in the year 2000, and thus assumes
the responsibility of formulating long-run policies
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in the Soviet Union. So far, he has performed
very
satisfactorily,
consolidating power
by
removing his major rivals in the Politburo and
replacing them with men who will most likely
support his programs
industrial growth and
change in social policy.
He has shown himself
an able diplomat in meetings with English prime
minister Thatcher and in the more recent summit
meeting with President Reagan. He has visited
France and Germany and will most likely pursue
improved relations with both Japan and China.
He sees economic reform as his main task, and
views the current period of economic slowdown as
one conducive to policy innovation.
Gorbachev
realizes that he cannot successfully carry out his
reforms if American military expenditures increase
and if relations with Japan and China worsen.
Accordingly, to facilitate his reforms, he would
most probably opt for renewed detente '2EPut with
more precise "rules of the game .•,
Some
scholars disagree and claim that so far Gorbachev
has
not
pursued
detente,
but
has only
strengthened the b'Waucracy and centralization
in the Soviet Union.
Still others conclude that
as a young leader with no war memory,
Gorbachev
may
be
inclined
to
be
more
adventurous and expansionist, especially if the
domestic situation looks bleak.
However, the
consensus is that the curr~t Soviet leadership is
unlikely to go to extremes.

f£5

Gorbachev
perceives
that
harmonious
relations with the United States can lead to
decreased Soviet military spending and therefore
increased domestic economic investment plus easier
access to badly needed technology from the West.
The United States, in turn, can receive trade
benefits and greater political leverage over the
Soviet Union by cooperating with a leadership
disposed to augmented cooperation with the United
States.
However, it would be naive to assume
that the United States will be able to dictate
policies to the Soviet Union; and if ever any
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political leverage is gained in the future, it will
have to be used in very discrete and diplomatic
ways. The Soviet economic and political system
will not collapse without aid from the West since
alternatives for economic cooperation may be
found. For example, the Soviet Union imported
12 million tons of grain from Argentina in
1980-82, M'ter the United States declared a grain
embargo....
New avenues may be opened for
increased freedom and human rights for Soviet
citizens if the United States learns to properly
use political and economic leverage in its foreign
policy towards the Soviet Union.
Soviet Ideology and Culture
In the United States, the belief persists that
the Soviet Union is, above and beyond other
considerations, a messianic state adhering to what
its people believe is superior ideology. They may
not have conquered the world, but the victory of
communism has no timetable and the Soviet
governm~t believes that communism will ultimately
triumph.
Robert
Osgood
has
succinctly
expressed this idea by stating that many believe
the Soviet
Union is
a
revolutionary and
expansionist state intent on conquering the world,
not "because of geopolitical insecurity, but
because of an inner compulsion that arises from
an ideological fixation, the totalitarian nature of
the
regim~i
and its
search for domestic
legitimacy. "
The preceding interpretation
of Soviet
ideology may be popular but not entirely
accurate.
True, the Soviet Union remains the
bastion of communist ideology, but this ideology
is used more as a legitimizing principle than as a
strict basis for internal and external policies.
The Soviet Union, like other cou ntries , is
affected by external 3~ealities and actions,
including world opinion.
Its leaders want to
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maximize power and use ideology to shape the
political
and
economic
perceptions
and
expectations that may vary from one leadership to
another. Domestic concerns also continue to grow
in complexity, and awareness of this comp1exi~~
influences Soviet interpretation of ideology.
For example, the growing discontent of the people
because of their leaders' inability to make their
words and deeds coincide renders it increasingly
difficult to move the people in the name of
ideology.
Moreover, the government no longer
has total control over the agents of political
socialization.
Legally or otherwise, information
from the outside world continues to flow into the
country, diversifying the §>,fop1e's perception and
interpretation of ideology.
Finally, the Soviet
people realize that the major expectations stemming from their ideology (e. g., the expansion of
communism, the downfall of the capitalist world,
and extensive Third World gravitation to the
Soviet camp) have not been realized; the Soviets
are not so naive as to overlook all th~5 facts.
They are willin g to learn from experience.
Domestic concerns rather than ideology,
then, will play the major role in Soviet foreign
affairs. If that is the case, future U. S. foreign
policy must be geared towards mutually beneficial
cooperation with the Soviet Union.
Trade-offs
may be negotiated in a way that will ensure
maximal satisfaction for both sides. The United
States, as well as the Soviet Union, must
emphasize abstract ideology less, in favor of more
tangible and beneficial points of cooperation
between the two countries.
Russian nationalism is another issue to
explore.
It remains the "strongest element in
Russian political culture"--a product of Russia'S
religious and political history. It is the cohesive
force within the political elite and between the
elite and the masses. It is a nationalism which
respects power, from the days of Peter the
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Great, to Stalin, to the current regime.
It
provides legitimacy (or at least an emotional base)
for authoritarianism and promotes a disappr<>:rEfll of
dissidents who threaten the national unity.
It
gives people the necessary strength to endure
what their government demands and to tolerate
and even support the deceptions propagated by
their
society--such
as
government -slogans
declaring the "dictatorship of the proletariat" a'39
that "the Party and the people are one."
Solzhenitsyn, perhaps the Soviet Union's most
famous dissident, provides insight into Russian
nationalism:
Communism will become less popular
only if proven incompatible with Russian
nationalism. The ideology is no longer
believed by many and ultimately, disastrous expansionism will be relegated
to a lesser posi,tj§m after "demands of
internal growth."
Thus, although the Soviet Union may be more
disposed towards cooperation, future U. S. foreign
policy must nevertheless remember that a transfer
of loyalty from the Soviet Union to the United
States is unlikely to transpire among the majority
of the Russian people.
Concessions from the
Soviet people and government, then, must be
expected in the context of Russian nationalism
and self-respect which the people have earned
and will undoubtedly want to keep.
In
domestic
economics,
politics,
and
ideology, it appears that the most beneficial
direction the Soviet Union can take is that of
greater cooperation with the United States.
However, it is dubious that this cooperation will
completely obliterate the very fundamental and
seemingly irreconcilable differences between the
two countries. But much can be done to mitigate
existing hostilities and tensions.
United States
foreign policy has a crucial role to play. It is in
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the best interest of the United States to take
advantage of opportunities for cooperation with
the Soviet Union. In' so doing, perhaps only a
minimal amount of material benefits will accrue to
the United States. Notwithstanding, other more
significant and valuable benefits may be received,
such as greater human rights and lesser
regimentation of action and thought for the Soviet
people.
These are reforms that the U. S.
government continually pressures the Soviet Union
to carry out.
Cooperation, not big power
aggression, may be the catalyst in the realization
of these reforms.
As Allman has so aptly
expressed in his article "Nice Guys Finish First,"
"When dealing with your neighbor, a business
rival, or the Soviet Union, the way to get ahead
is to get along." He formulated this conclusion
based on a game called "Prisoner's Dilemma, "
where the more 3bwO people cooperate, the better
off they are.
Finally, Schevchen ko, the
highest Soviet official to defect to the United
States, says: "The USSR cannot be erased from
the earth or removed from its position at the
center of power in the modern world.
The
survival of mankind may depend upon temperate
relati04lf between the Soviet Union and the
U. S. "
Indeed,
in
the
year
2000
and
subsequently, U. S. foreign policy must continue
to. find ways to increase cooperation, lessen
hostilities, and build trust with the Soviet Union.
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